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Mehmet Tevfik Ozcan
 
 
The Rule of Law After Globalisation: Is Myth or Reality? 
 
Abstract:  The  rule  of  law  is  unique  establishment  that  had  taken  place  in  historical  context,  as 
politico-legal  edifice  of  capitalist  society.  To  the  extent  that  any  legal  system  was  established  in 
historical context, its form and functioning are cannot be channelled by reflections or professional 
commitments of lawyers and legal philosophers. The rule of law emerged in certain conditions that we 
say “classical liberalism”, of power allocation where we diversify political power and legal power in 
the milieu of political society, enunciated as republic or commonwealth. Contrary to earlier forms of 
legal order, capitalism was unique that its super structure was articulated according to the pivotal 
role of legal machinery. There was an actual equilibrium between legal and political domains that 
they moderately matched with public and private dichotomy. After monopoly capitalism, social setting 
of liberalism was dramatically incurred some major modifications which were firstly dislocation of 
liberal individual, incited by monopoly capital and secondly, political achievement of the working 
classes obtained political equality, as drastic consequence of mass society. Hence, the rule of law 
altered  as  depoliticsation  of  democratised  mass  society,  instead  of  modus  vivendi  of  liberal 
individuals, which demarcated the rule of law according to welfare society or sozialrechtsstaat. The 
neo-liberal globalisation after 1980’s, republican model of political society faded away that it has 
been transformed by transnational capital where markets, hierarchies, regionalism and communal 
settings crosscut inner equilibrium between politics and law. Finally, the newborn articulation of 
power structure undermined necessary basement of the rule of law.  
Keywords: the rule of law, capitalism, liberalism, welfare state, globalisation.  
 
I. Introduction 
There are capital problems of philosophy of law that they are philosophical interpretations 
upon  how  more  justifiable  legal  order  can  be  established  or  anyhow  philosophical 
contribution  can  be  performed  to  the  extent  to  which  might  remedy  to  laypersons.  In 
contemporary world, philosophical elucidations and actual legal order are distinct domains 
that there cannot be any smooth interpenetration between them wherefore the philosopher, 
apart from her or his achievement on legal theory,  criticises legal machinery in order to 
delineate claims of justice, as outward aspect of legal system, in general. As having been 
disclosed by Niklas Luhmann with his system theory of law
1, which opened up new frontiers 
                                                           
 Professor of Philosophy and Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law, Istanbul University. 
1 Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System, Trans. by Klaus A. Ziegert, Ed. by Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, 
David Schiff, and Rosamund Ziegert, Introduction by, Richard Nobles and David Schiff, 2004. 2 
for researching legal domain, philosophical criticisms concerned to justice, which must be 
expounded  as  outward  communication  of  legal  practice.  On  the  contrary,  inner 
communication of the legal system belongs to the legal practitioners who essentially deal with 
problem of legality, instead of outward value of justice, which belonging to the environment 
of  legal  system
2.  Theoretically,  we  should  presume  that  philosophical  criticisms  are 
acquisitions of civilisation, well, but there is not a necessary correlation between philosopher 
and lawyer, especially after huma nist paradigm was abandoned by post -modern usage in 
humanities. Even though, as having been disclosed in Critical Legal Studies movement, some 
secondary aspects of legal system might be transformed via activist initiatives or candid 
devotions of philosophers, core characteristics of the legal system remains intact where 
substantive premises of law can be concluded according to the liberal ideology of law.  
When a legal philosopher is so keen to contribute established legal order, the legal order 
seems her or him very likely a presumption or embodiment of certain legal idea. On the 
contrary, legal order in action is a transpersonal social setting that they might be yielded from 
a series of juxtapositions or contingencies in the social milieu, which cannot be  reduced 
solitary action of any constructive idea or particular will. In this context, the legal system is 
embodiment of the certain power system of society that it might depend either a monopoly of 
power, as having been articulated in imperial form of domination or otherwise relied on self-
effacing power allocation in commonwealth model of liberal society. Both of them externally 
constrain human beings in order to drive them to act harmonious conduct with the legal 
machinery,  which  cannot  be  solely  extingui shed  or  domesticated  by  a  philosophical 
elucidation. Despite miscellaneous ideas is elucidated ethical conduct or ethical deliberation 
among consociates, legal machinery can only be transformed by a strategic action, which 
concerned to change established power equilibrium by way of piecemeal modification or any 
drastic compulsions of revolution or counter-revolution. The rule of law is viable if it anyway 
fits with unassailable constraint of legal domain, which matched with legal power, to the 
extent that it should not be extinguished by one sided deliberation of political power.  
 
 
 
                                                           
2 Lyons expresses a theoretical standpoint upon how the rule of law that depended on some number of values for 
attaining better society with credence about higher values (primordial one is procedural justice or procedural 
rationality,  conforming  to  Rawlsian  approach)  must  be  pursued  by  everyone  in  unanimity,  as  rulers  or 
laypersons. No one can deny higher values, but to safeguard and improve them needs some systemic or structural 
constraints, instead of responsiveness of government and personal obligation to obey law. Cf., David Lyons, 
Ethics and the Rule of Law, 1979, 194-214. 3 
II. Necessary Properties of the Rule of Law 
In contemporary legal philosophy, greater numbers of criticisms are aiming to better the rule 
of  law  or  to  institute  it  in  some  other  countries  (mostly  underdeveloped)  that  they  urge 
political  activism to  reinforce legal  edifice for  the sake of minimum  standards of human 
dignity. Whereas the rule of law is an open-textured legal domain, it gradually embraces all 
proliferation of right-claims, which might be injected into the substantive law and portrayed 
with  some  significant  components.  Apart  from  its  comprehensiveness,  respecting  to  the 
substantive provisions thereof, the rule of law is basically delineated by way of procedural 
provisions which offers layperson legal remedies and upholds legal rights and freedoms when 
she or he is inflicted a violation. A. V. Dicey aligned the three indispensable properties of the 
rule of law
3 that (1) every due punishment and redress to civil wrongs can only be sentenced 
when distinct breach of law assigned before ordinary courts and in ordinary legal manner (i. e. 
due procedure) of established laws of country; (2) every human being, whatever his rank or 
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of realm and amenable to the jurisdictions of ordinary 
tribunals; (3) predominance of the legal spirit, which was alleged by Dicey for British 
institutions,  must  be  necessary  characteristic  of  the  political  realm  that  it  means  legal 
remedies infuse the constitution via minimizing political discretion. In this context, valid legal 
rules of the legal system of country may impose minimum or maximum content of the rights 
for legal persons, as  citizens or as human beings, therefore the rule  of law highlights 
procedural rights and remedies under supremacy of judiciary in daily life. 
Regarding to the appropriate legal environment, the rule of law is far -reaching social 
establishment, which ubiquitously concerns legal and non -legal (political and economical) 
domains of greater society, totally enunciated as “political society”. Let we temporarily set 
aside social conditions of the rule of law and shed light on its necessary components. A legal 
theorist or a legal philosopher accentuates a series of institutions when participates a debate 
about how the rule of law works. In this context, an institutional system reveal itself that it 
partially belongs actual mechanism, related to the constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers and administration of justice whatsoever and partially to the legal canon, conducting 
all  commitments  of  the  law.  Dicey’s  abovementioned  criteria  require  some  indispensable 
guidelines that all legal debate on the rule of law relied on their ramifications or proliferation 
with respecting to the expanding scope of the legal domain in the modern society
4. 
                                                           
3 A. V. Dicey, Introduction of the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 1915, 182-199. 
4 I must cite some beneficiary contributions that clarify necessary properties of the rule of law: Lord Bingham, 
The Rule of Law, Cambridge Law Journal, 66 (2007), 67-85; Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law 
and Morality,1979, 213-218; Augusto Zimmermann, The Rule of Law as a Culture of Legality: Legal and Extra-
Legal Elements for the Realisation of the Rule of Law, Murdoch University E-Law Journal, 14 (2007), 10-31; 4 
 
A. Constitutional provisions relating to the rule of law:  
(1)  Equality before law: The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent 
that  objective  differences  justify  differentiation,  not  detrimental  to  the  principle  of 
equality before law.  
(2) Unity and individuality of the legal subject is acknowledged by constitution, insofar as 
that liberal ideology is taken together or injected into the ideology of law. The law must 
afford adequate protection of the bill of rights of human individual or the fundamental 
human rights. 
(3)  As  republican  sovereignty  postulated,  separation  of  powers  differentiates  executive, 
legislative and judicial functions in the milieu that judicial function is decisive to what 
extent civil litigation at the hand. 
(4) Laws must limit, control and guide the exercise of official discretion; therefore, crime-
preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law. Executive or administrative 
officials must reasonably exercise their power in good faith without exceeding the power 
which conferred them by constitution or any other statute, sub-rule or regulation.  
(5)  The  legislative  power  must  respect  rights  and  liberties  of  individuals,  therefore,  all 
legislative enactments are contingent on the judicial review.  
(6) Autonomy, impartiality and accessibility of the judiciary must be guaranteed.  
(7) All disputes should be fairly decided in the manner to restrain extemporary decisions, 
might  possibly  generating  from  personal  idiosyncrasy  of  individual  judges.  As  a 
principle, all cases may be subject to judicial review. 
(8) The scope of political power and law enforcement should be delimited by judicial control 
as restricting discretionary or arbitrary coercion to the private individuals.  
(9) The courts and every kind of judicial means must be provided to layperson as easily 
accessible, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay when  bona fide civil disputes 
emerge, which the parties themselves are unable to resolve. 
(10) As bona fide principle and pacta sunt servanda, compliance of the state to its obligations 
in  international  law  that  the  law  which  whether  deriving  from  treaty  or  international 
custom and practice governs the conduct of nations. 
(11) As corollary of constitutional and legal culture, people should be guided and ruled by the 
law and comply it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Anthony Mason, The Rule of Law and International Economic Transactions, Globalisation and the Rule of Law, 
Ed. by, Spencer Zifcak, 2005, 125; Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal, The Rule of Law, 
History, Theory and Criticism, Ed. by, Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo, 2007, 18-30.  5 
B. Principles of law, which must fairly be applied all legal grievances 
(1) The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear, predictable definite 
and accountable. 
(2) Laws should be certain and adequately publicised. 
(3) As possible as, laws should be stable. 
(4) The rule of law should guarantee a certain generality, openness and clearness of laws. 
(5) Apart from some exceptional cases which justify retroactivity, as reasonable departure 
from principle, all laws should be prospective.  
(6) The making of particular legal norms (particular legal orders), which implemented by way 
of legislation or judicial lawmaking, should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general 
rules or legal principles. 
(7) Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the 
law and not the exercise of political or administrative discretion. 
(8) Adjudicative procedures, which backed by the state, should be fair. 
(9) As justification of court decision, the principles of justice and sense of justice must be 
observed. 
(10) Decisions of courts should rely on reasonableness and becoming justifiable, with respect 
to the principles. 
 
The rule of law is a subspecies of the legally ordered society that it purports not only to use 
norms  as  a  means  of  government,  but  also  governance  by  legal  rules  must  be  entirely 
predominant in the legally legitimised political society. Therefore, the rule of law not only 
concerned to legal domain, but also that legal spirit of law should permeate political domain 
in the manner how political legitimisation takes place by way of legality. In this context, 
albeit necessarily pure political conduct of state, as observed in retribution in international law 
or  emergency  condition  (previously  stipulated  by  law),  all  political  and  administrative 
discretions are diminished and curbed by law. As having been implied by Dicey, the rule of 
law is, by and large, abnegation of political discretion and legal check to the administrative 
discretion
5. The rule of law is zenith of the separation of powers in a sovereign state in the 
political society context that it is viable when the power is duly implemented by means of 
division between participated political centres, peers and in any extent political participation. 
Despite the fact that fundamentals of the rule of law dimly established in social conflict 
between political claimants, John Locke, British philosopher, maturely traced according to the 
                                                           
5 Dicey (note 3), 185-188. 6 
political model of liberal society and of its actual or taken for granted political participation
6. 
According to the Lockean story about how political society established, human beings enact a 
contract to protect their natural liber ties, which enumerated as life liberty and property. 
Therefore nexus of the social contract was right to punish violation, when might be inflicted 
to the natural liberties that it embodied to establishment of judiciary and civil (penal) laws 
thereof. As regards, the rule of law yielded from a sum total of political participation, which a 
matter of fact development in itself, it should not be deemed likely ideal stage of human 
progress, regardless to its socio -political environment. On the contrary, it is de pendent on 
constitutional system that it might only be safeguarded by duly political equilibrium, which 
carried on by structural positioning of participants in the status quo of liberal society. 
 
III. Some Cursory Remarks on the Rule of Law Establishment 
The rule of law was established to some extent in the viable social milieu, but it takes place in 
various forms according to the social conditions, political experiences and legal culture of any 
given society. First of all, we must typically regard liberal rule of law, to that I prefer to say 
“the procedural rule of law”, which coincided with classical liberalism in the normal course of 
capitalist accumulation and social formation, as observed in the histories of the Great Britain 
and United States of America. The other model is the rule of law in the milieu of welfare 
state, that is I say “the substantive rule of law”, that it discloses German sozialrechtsstaat and 
overlaps  not  only  welfare  state  policies  of  the  era  of  monopoly  capitalism,  but  also  had 
stemmed from regulatory state in state-sponsored development of capitalism, as observed in 
19
th century of Imperial Germany
7. In this context, both of the two variants of the rule of law 
are in close relationship with capitalism and modern society.  
                                                           
6 John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, Introduction by, William S. Carpenter, 1966, 154-164 
7 I expressed my idea in some recent publications: Mehmet Tevfik Ozcan, Rule of Law: A Modus Vivendı or an 
Imaginary  Relationship,  Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, Vol. 38 (2006), 49-59; Mehmet Tevfik 
Ozcan, Modern Toplum ve Hukuk Devleti (The Rule of Law and Modern Society), 2008; Mehmet Tevfik Ozcan, 
Capitalism and the Rule of Law: The Three Stages of Legal Order in Modern Society (Abstract), IVR 24th World 
Congress, Global Harmony and Rule of Law September 15-20, 2009, Vol. I, 177-182. Mehmet Tevfik Ozcan, 
Pravoe  Pravlenie:  Çeloveçeskaya  Dobrodatal  (Trans  by,  B.  K.  Shreibera),  Vestnik  Çelyabinskova 
Gosudarstvennove Universiteta (Filosofiya Sotsiologiya, Kulturologiya), Vol. 18 (2009), 40-46 My point of 
view might be considered as similar to the Tamanaha’s distinction between “formal” and “substantive” theories 
of the rule of law, but he highlighted theoretical elucidations on the matter, whereas I apprehend the rule of law 
as structural inclination which outcome of capitalist social formation. Cf., Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of 
Law, 2004. At the  first sight, in  Craig and  Zimmermann (see note 4) separately specify the differentiation 
between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law. Their formal rule of law seems parallel with my 
procedural  rule  of  law  consideration,  whereas  they  delve  into  ethical  content  upon  how  expounded  the 
substantive conception. Thus, their substantive conception of the rule of law” is totally dissimilar my point of 
view, because they enunciate an ethical debate, whereas my concern is plainly relevant only to substantive law. I 
consider that both of the two conceptions are enunciation of structural component of political society, but cannot 
be  solitarily  reduced  ethical  conduct  of  legal  professionals  or  legal  domain  which  is  imbued  with  ethical 
evaluation such as. Cf., Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 7 
The liberal (procedural) rule of law is backbone of the rule of law conception that it 
embraces personal freedom in the content what political liberalism alleges. Overwhelming 
majority of legal scholars in modern times when plainly enunciate “the law”, they overtly or 
tacitly delve into legally ordered society whatsoever delineate the rule of law. Despite some 
miscellaneous  pros  or  cons  arguments  on  the  rule  of  law
8, there is  vis-à-vis  paralleling 
between  the  rule  of  law  and  ingenious  ordering  of  any  capitalist  society  that  it  set  forth 
individual  freedom,  non-existence  of  political  paternalism  and  of  to  the  extent  to  which 
legitimate  governance  through  individual  wills.  Among  others,  Immanuel  Kant  brilliantly 
compartmentalised  the  two  distinct  domains  of  the  ethics  and  law  that  the  former  is 
embodiment of internal legislation of the moral obligation, whereas the latter denotes the 
domain of external legislation of legal right, which grounded on presumed compromise of 
plurality,  sum  total  of  the  personal  wills
9.  The point of view cited is repugnant to the 
paternalist politics and its legal constellation in agro-literate society, which faded away from 
early beginnings of capitalism. Legal domain of any agro -literate society was composed of 
performative acts of sovereign which interpreted and systematised in any extent canonised by 
labour of clergy
10, or at least, as having been visible in the middle ages, preached by joint 
action  of  the prince  and  papal  government.  As  Waldron pointed,  the rule  of  law  was 
established after a political upside down that godly governed society had been replaced by the 
society governing with human laws
11. When economic infra-structure of feudal society was 
gradually fading away onwards 13
th  century,  money  economy  wielded  its  influence  onto 
sovereign  bodies  in  the  manner  how  expanding  financial  shortages  embittered  the 
relationships between kings and their vassals in levying more burdensome taxes. Therefore, 
taxation  conflict  between  Norman  kings  and  noble  class  before  Magna  Carta  of  1215 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Framework, Public Law (1997), 467-487. At the outset, I borrowed the conception of Ernst Rudolf Huber, 
German lawyer, by way of an article, translated to Turkish where he considered the substantive conception as an 
outcome of the social change which took place in the base structure of society, named as industrial society, 
which conducted to establishment of welfare state.  See, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Modern Endustri Toplumunda 
Hukuk Devleti ve Sosyal Devlet (Trans by, Tugrul Ansay), Ankara Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Dergisi, 27 
(1970), 27-51 (Original publication: E. R. Huber, Nationalstaat und Verfassungsstaat, Studien zur Geschichte 
der Modernen Staatsidee, 1965, 249-272). 
8 For example see, Martin Kryger, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections after the Collapse of Communism, 
Law and Social Inquiry, 15 (1990), 633-663; Richard Abel, Capitalism and the Rule of Law: Precondition or 
Contradiction, Law and Social Inquiry, 15 (1990), pp. 685-697. 
9 Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence, Trans. 
by,  W.Hastie,  1887,  14,  20-23,  46.  Despite,  Puchta  was  closer  to  the  Hegelian  philosophy  and  German 
romanticism,  he  is  very  parallel  to  the  Kantian  point  of  view  when  demarcate  the  legal  right  and  moral 
obligation. Cf., G. F., Puchta, Outlines of Jurisprudence, as the Science of Right, a Juristic Encyclopaedia, 
Outlines of The Science of Jurisprudence, Ed. and Trans by, W. Hastie, 1887, 1-134. 
10 See, Jan, Assman, Kulturel Bellek, Eski Yuksek Kulturlerde Yazi, Hatirlama ve Politik Kimlik, Trans. by, Ayse 
Tekin, 2001 (Original: Die Kulturelle Gedachnis, Schrift, Erinnerung und Politische in früen Hochkulturen, 
1997).. 
11 Jeremy Waldron, The Law, 1990, 39, 45. 8 
exponentially  prolonged  after  the  charter.  In  this  milieu,  it  developed  on  the  one  hand 
separation of powers between kings and so named the national councils
12, on the other hand 
sovereignty  furthered  as  national  unification  under  the  guidance  of  charters  and  laws. 
Although, capitalist mode of production might be dated to emergence of yeoman farmers of 
Tudor times
13, its germ and social milieu took place after Magna Carta. As far as my 
information availed, “the rule of law” term was uttered the first time by Sir Edward Coke, on 
1603  while  James  VI  the  King  of  Scotland  was  marching  to  London  from  Scotland  for 
accession to the British throne as James I
14, in the meantime, capitalist society, as its social 
environment and legal experimentation, had already became matured.      
Regarding  to  the  common  law,  Dicey  highlights  judge  made  law  and  unwritten 
constitution  as ideal  of  the rule  of  law  that  it  corresponds  with  minimal  discretion  of 
legislature which might be harmful to the juristic power and legal rulings
15. Furthermore, the 
British legal experience also underlines balanced roles of legislation and judge-made law in a 
way how determining position of non -written law. Albeit some revolutionary renovations 
took place, as Justice Holmes pointed, any legal system (in ca pitalist societies, too) is 
institutionalised  within  its  surrounding  peculiarities,  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  an 
embodiment of a single ordering idea or an incessant tradition
16. Therefore, common law 
system was a sum total of miscellaneous legal experiences, which accumulated in the course 
of history, hereafter its formal and substantive components matched in an evolutionary 
process, very likely to the Darwinian struggle for survival. British liberalism and the rule of 
law began with Christian-blended natural law after Magna Carta and reached legal positivism 
nineteenth century onwards. As Holt pointed, Magna Carta of 1215 (also reissuing on 1217 
and 1237 Parva Carta) engendered not only granting freedom, but also a profound tradition of 
legislation thereof by way of its approval by the 56 local parliaments on 1237
17. Holt also 
testifies that Magna Carta incited adjudication with juries, which was composed of peers, 
according to the lex terrae. Therefore, lex terrae metamorphosed to “the due process of law”, 
after revisions- implemented by legislation between1331-1368
18. 
                                                           
12 Shepard Assman Morgan, The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England, 1911. 
13 Cf., E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 1990, 42-46. 
14 Jim Corkery, The Rule of Law, The National Eagle (November 2000), 3-7. 
15 Dicey (note 3), 192. 
16 O. W. Holmes The Common Law, 1882, 1-37. 
17 J. C. Holt, Ancient Constitution in Medieval England, The Roots of Liberty, Ed. By, Ellis Sandoz, 1993, 32-74. 
18 Holt (See note 17), 62. 9 
After Magna Carta, dominant consideration on the British law was generally spoken as 
common law that it was all embracing for British people, which expressed as consuetude
19. In 
this  milieu,  lex  terrae  was  backbone  of  legal  system,  therefore  all  legal  acquis  was 
unaffectedly constellation of unwritten law, inasmuch as Edward I (who named as English 
Justinian) and succeeding kings venerated it in their legislative policy. Whereas the period 
clarified  significance  of  legislation,  very  likely  that  it  presumed  legislation  as  restated 
utterance of jus non scripta
20. I am not sure, but it might be said that consideration of time 
was so parallel to the opinion which uttered by Saint Thomas Aquinas in Question 90 of 
Summa Theologica
21. Indeed, common law was considered as implementation of practical 
reason, therefore legislative actions were human laws in Saint Thomas’s point of view, which 
inspired by natural law inasmuch as inspired by divine providence. At the end of the 15
th 
century,  Sir  John  Fortescue,  the  well-known  jurist  from  Lancastrian  house,  vociferously 
posited  natural  law  doctrine  to  maintain  law-based  governance  of  king,  councils  and  the 
peers
22. Fortescue asserted that kingship was initially usu rpation, but it might be legitimised 
by means of recourse to councils and governance through legal rules which deduced from the 
law of nature. The corollary of this idea is that the statutes, which might be proclaimed by a 
prince or a king, should be enact ed by Parliament, as demonstrating conformity to the 
common law, in spite of solitary discretion or arbitrary commands of despotism
23.     
The fact that British legal history or the history of the rule of law does not display a 
smooth path of development, therefore we must especially regard to the political convulsions 
and fluctuations. Thus, the Tudor and Stuart eras urged dissimilar legal considerations and 
debates to the extent that separation of power and embodiment of general will whatsoever 
declined.  Inasmuch  as  Elizabethan  period  visibly  demonstrated,  dominant  legal  opinion 
shifted to the ancient theories of Cicero and Stoicism that, to a greater extent, they are 
syncretistic fusing of ethical theories with religious dogma, instead of elucidation of th e 
theoretical grounds of the separation of powers
24. Meanwhile, Magna Carta remained intact, 
but very tiny referred and that it considered as  statuta antiqua. The exampled book of the 
period was Doctor and Student of Christopher Saint German that it was very likely to the 
revival of Saint Augustine, which interpreted the law according to the conjectural hierarchy of 
                                                           
19 Charles Howard McIlwain, Magna Carta and Common Law, Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, Ed. by, 
Henry Elliot Malden, 1917, 122-179. 
20 McIlwain (See note 19) 149. 
21 See, Thomas Aqunias Treatise on Law, Summa Theologica, Questions 90-97) Introduction, Stanley Parry., (w. 
date).. 
22 John Fortescue, The Governance of England, Ed. by, Charles Plummer 1926. 
23 Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae Introduction by, A. Amos, 1825, 41. 
24 Christopher W. Brooks, The Place of Magna Carta and the Ancient Constitution in Sixteenth Century English 
Legal Thought, The Roots of Liberty, Ed. by, Ellis Sandoz, 1993, 75-114. 10 
sources, regardless to actual or taken for granted collision between monarchical power and 
judiciary
25. In this milieu, Fortescue and Coke were f requently cited as adversary opinions 
against dominant legal thought. It must be added that ostensible contribution of the time was 
certain furtherance in implementing equality before law, as direct or indirect acquisition to 
advance the rule of law.  
Beforehand the Tudor era, British experience eventually matched with limitation of 
sovereign power of the monarch and expanding role of the legal domain that it weakened 
political discretion in favour of legal authorisation. Although it was not first example o f 
limitation of monarchical political discretion, all pre -modern sovereign political bodies had 
been urging legal recourse in order to entrench transpersonal sovereignty by way of canonised 
laws and regulations, but they were lacking in power allocation wh ich sharing power with 
judiciary. Prior to the Tudor dynasty, the separation of powers, under the gist of feudal 
society, stiffened by way of councils, which checked political discretion of the king in two 
ways, either expansion of judicial function or to delimit legislative policy. In the middle Ages, 
the councils of the Norman rule in Britain, which named as  parliament or under any other 
wordings,  such  as,  curia,  concilium  ordinarium,  concilium  privatum,  magnum  concilium, 
commune concilium, were of judicial character, unfamiliar with political role of the modern 
parliaments. At the same time, albeit some exceptions, statutory legislation was so seldom, 
even  though  it  had  been  known  since  King  Aethelberth  of  sixth  Century
26. Wherefore a 
legislative document sporadically emanated, it was not considered as declaration of a novel 
substantive  law  provision  in  order  to  entrench  existing  legal  corpus,  moreover  it  was 
embodied as anew declaration of customary law or refinement of existing law as worded 
precisely  or  annulling  unreasonable  provisions.  In  this  milieu,  lawyers  and  parliaments 
alleged that customary law equated with common reason which couched as the will of 
society. 
Parliamentary legislation fully injected British realm during the Tudor era while the 
parliament failed its judicial role and became legislator
27. Concurrently, judiciary altered in 
favour of proliferation of the courts, wherefore the Star Chamber was most prominent among 
others. In the whirlpool alteration of British politics, legislation and common law clashed to a 
greater extent, especially during Stuart time with climax of the absolutist tendencies of the 
kings.  The  common  law  and  unwritten  constitution  was  traditionally  harmonious  with 
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separation of powers which anchored in indispensable pre-eminence of the judiciary, even 
though the king was officially sovereign. It is evident that, in this milieu, legislation has minor 
importance and accomplished to any extent amenable the judge-made law. King James I of 
Stuart raised claims for legislation with believing inaptitude of traditional legal canon of the 
common law. Therefore, he revisited hereditary rights of the sovereign king that he regarded 
the kingdom was divine gift, as disclosed in his admonitions, titled as Basilikon Doron
28. 
James I was so reserved king to lawyers and common law tradition, therefore he claimed 
expediency of the civil law education in universities and codification of common law with 
inspiring Catholicism and legal traditions of France, Spain and Scotland
29. In this context, 
Coke, Selden and Hedley, who were pre-eminent jurists of the age, raised their objections that 
they hinged on national character of common law and its avowed certainty, with respecting to 
the Fortescue’s ideas on natural law and governance through law.      
The legal debate of Stuart era was not only impinging on the legal system by way of 
quarrelsome  pretensions,  but  also  stretched  the  debate  between  absolutism  and 
constitutionalism, ascendancy of papal authority and Puritanism (or Presbyterianism). In this 
milieu, the debate for lunnage and poundage taxes coalesced with demand for parliamentary 
power and respect to Magna Carta, as the king was admonished by the Petition of Rights on 
1628, and therefore the civil war prompted parliamentary sovereignty of the Long Parliament 
and  superimposition  of  legislation.  Subsequently,  despite  nobility  had  cogently  aspired 
sovereignty of the king, they eventually swayed to acclaim the rights and liberties thereby 
amended in Magna Carta and used to be empowered. The line of debate signalled national 
compromise  of  restoration  of  1688,  as  depicted  by  Locke  in  his  Second  Treatise,  where 
political society was redefined according to the commonwealth which characterised by central 
role of judiciary. Even though Locke did not utter a juristic language, he defined civil society 
to  the extent that it should  safeguard natural  rights  (i. e. life, liberty  and property), with 
moderate legislation, strictly considered as civil laws
30. It is evident that so called “civil laws” 
specifically aimed to  prohibit  violation of natural  rights; therefore,  respecting to  classical 
form of the common law, while substantive law of liberal individual remained, as ordered by 
judge-made common law. Apart from criticisms on liberal purview or about its strict reliance 
to property owners, Locke mutely synthesised historical influx of the common law. 
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Despite  Lockean  ideas  on  political  society  which  they  were  articulated  in  a  pseudo-
historic  frame,  his  ideas  represented  the  sum  total  of  the  historical  accumulation  of  the 
ongoing British political and legal experimentation which inaugurated in the political conflict 
between king and peers. It reached surpassing social role of bourgeoisie, which took part as 
burgeoning  agent  of  the  political  opposition.  On  the  one  hand,  bourgeoisie  rigorously 
acknowledged inception of parliamentary legislation, on the other hand it made incentive to 
the maturation of the separation of powers. Therefore, political and legal domains reached 
matter-of-fact  equilibrium  where  “natural”  order  summarized  in  such  an  order,  whereby 
represented by national trait of the British society. As reflected in the ideas of David Hume, 
state and law is contingent, but inalienable components of the civic life, which conducted 
reliable compromise between power and liberty. In his consideration upon “politics may be 
reduced  to  a  science”,  he  pointed  well  balanced  government  which  aroused  in  historical 
experience  of  politics,  moderation  and  assessment  on  British  institutions
31. By the same 
token, Adam Smith designated the law for protection of individual from injuries, which might 
inflict his personality, reputation and property, in his “natural” jurisprudence
32. Concurrently, 
albeit any constructive idea was absent, for Adam Ferguson, the civil society is a consequence 
that  it  developed  by  historical  advancement,  whatsoever  proven  by  scientific  research
33. 
Those historical, scientific or pseudo-scientific ideas, which emanated from various authors of 
eighteenth century, conservatism of the common law swayed to a utilitarian use of historical 
past,  as  “forensic  history”
34.  Consequentially,  the  idea  of  governance,  which  was  well-
balanced with freedom, remained central theme that the law is prerequisite of freedom, more 
correctly “private property” by which axiom of political participation set forth male person 
property owner, with setting apart disrespected propertyless bystanders.  
Regarding  to  the  necessary  properties  of  the  rule  of  law,  as  abovementioned,  they 
highlight that the two essential powers, which titled as legislative and executive (in which we 
deem cabinet, presidential discretion and administration), should be curbed by the law. The 
rule of law assumes not only every individual’s and government’s allegiance to the law, but 
also conditions statutes and other legislative acts’ coherence with the law, in spite of legislator 
(i. e. parliament) is superior. Corollary of this fact was that all statutes became annullable by 
judiciary whatsoever all laws might be challenged and potentially and actually repealed by the 
court, according to the process due to them. Regarding to the parliament was highest court as 
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before Tudorian era, legislative acts had been exclusively controlled before the judiciary, even 
anterior to their proclamation and dissemination. Otherwise a complete statute or its some 
provisions  theoretically  might  not  be  feasible  respecting  to  the  case  at  stake;  the  legal 
provision  would  be  therefore  dismissed.  Thus,  Dr.  Bonham  case  on  1610,  in  England, 
deserves special attention, by which Court of Common Pleas annulled a parliamentary statute 
that it already granted Royal College of Physicians to give licence to physicians. Under the 
headship of Sir Coke, the court declared that any act of the parliament is void when violate a 
common right or reason, assumed in the common law, because the act, in practice, granted the 
college members, which composed of physicians, to judge their own case
35. Afterwards, Dr. 
Bonham case was eventually cited in some another cases in Great Britain and America, such 
as Commonality of London v. Woods on 1701, Trevett v. Weeden on 1786 in Rhode Island 
Superior Court or Marbury v. Madison on 1803 in United States. Even though, sovereign 
power of legislature became constitutional principle after Long Parliament, Blackstone’s tenth 
rule posited that  a legislative act  is  void when commands  absurdity, impracticability  and 
unreasonable consequences
36.       
Now, let us briefly glimpse at the rule of law experiences of some other countries that 
they disclose some other national characteristics. First of all, the rule of law solely practicable 
under national unification together with due separation of powers,  which makes British 
example evident, because the first country can coped with the problem at earliest date. 
Despite,  I  found  her  ideas  uncompromising  in  general,  Blandine  Kriegel  vehemently 
expressed that main prerequisite for the rule of law is centralisa tion of governmental system 
through law and judiciary, as England zenith of it, earlier than two and half centuries from 
other European states
37. Therefore, Continental European and other countries remarkably 
lagged in comparison with British example. As a  matter of fact, American colonies before 
1776 Revolution were normally adhering common law even where they were absent from 
equal representation in the parliament. Moreover, we can cite some overt provisions about 
how extension of British laws to colonies  (including American colonies), especially the 
statutes, enacted by Charles II and William III (William of Orange)
38. As interpreted by Coxe, 
the statute, which legislated by William III, did not overtly proclaim that the colonial laws 
might be repugnant to  acts of British Parliament, they were not null and void. In this case, 
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such acts of British Parliament must not be considered that they were extended to the colony. 
By the same token, 18
th Century British forensic history aforementioned, which entrenched 
common law in anew elucidation to rely on a taken for granted national breed, it extended the 
utterance of “freeborn Englishmen” and Bill of Rights to American colonies
39. Lastly, it must 
be added that Stamp Act debate onwards 1765 resurrected a controversy on equality between 
Englishmen and colonial born Americans. 
Between American Revolution on 1776 and promulgation of United States Constitution 
on  1787,  judiciaries  of  American  states  was  familiar  to  the  judicial  review  for  states’ 
legislation, such as Trevett v. Weeden on 1786 in Rhode Island
40. To a great extent The 
United States Constitution imbued with common law doctrine and all acquisitions of the Bill 
of Rights where in the Fifth Amendment trial by jury in the indictment of treason as due 
process of law and substantive due process in every kind of litigation in the Fourteenth 
Amendment on 1868, whereby civil or criminal cases specifically cited. In this milieu, 
American constitutionalism was inherently relying on the liberal (procedural) rule of law, 
which  congruent  with  prevalent  small  property  ownership  and  casting  out  political 
paternalism even where British-like peerage was absent. Fourteenth amendment was outcome 
of the post Civil War developments. The two groups of events must be specifically cited
41 that 
firstly slaughterhouse cases in Louisiana, that they emerged from state legislature’s grants 
privileges in favour of some slaughterhouse owners, that is violation on the freedom of trade. 
And secondly, even though, the Thirteenth amendment abolished slavery, a great number of 
employers were reluctant to make labour contract with black labourers. The question for black 
people was tried to be mitigated by way of the two super-statutes which titled as Civil Rights 
Act and Freedman Bureau Bill, but failed. The two cases induce legislation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that it brought substantive due process, whatsoever main pillar of the American 
rule of law in order to uphold rights and liberties of liberal individual.   
British  and  United  States  establishment  of  the  rule  of  law  is  in  close  affinity  with 
political liberalism which hinged on a social substratum of competitive capitalism, as Marxian 
approach dichotomised as base and super-structure. Whereas the sum total of legal experience 
began feudal time, the base of capitalism steered nexus of separation of powers under national 
unification  through  law  and  judiciary.  Subsequently,  bourgeoisie,  pivotal  dynamic  of 
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capitalist development, entrenched and advanced the legacy of the late feudalism. The liberal 
rule of law formed a legal legitimisation unto politics, which backed by equality before law 
and  safeguarded  by  augmentation  of  political  participation  within  outer  limits  of  overall 
liberalism, but to any extent it did not stipulate democracy. As regards Tawney’s point of 
view on liberal society, liberal government resembles a joint-stock company that wills of its 
shareholders  (i. e., peers,  small property owners,  tradesmen and petty-sized industrialists) 
were limited with the principles of the common law and approved by “common sense” of 
propertied classes in politics
42. Let we compare the other Western societies, especially France 
and Germany, such societies were in a remarkable lag in capitalist development, especially 
regarding to the industrial revolution where political limitation of state could not be achieved 
by diffusing power of bourgeoisie. However, at the threshold of the nineteenth century, their 
social structure was seriously demolished by side effects of the capitalist world system that 
they  busied  with  either  revolutionary  inclinations  or  to  accomplish  national  union  (for 
Germany). Therefore, they were pushed an opposite path, nevertheless they debated on  der 
rechtsstaat or l’état du droit which aimed to re-establish state under the pivotal role of law in 
order  to  cope  with  national  unification  problem  or  anew  constitutional  drafts,  but  failed 
because the rule of law cannot be achieved by legislative schemes and codification. However, 
those are viable instruments, crucial in their political agenda, but, for the rule of law, they 
needed national unification by means of autonomous judiciary and depoliticsation, with its 
superimposition instead. In this milieu the intellectuals expressed very remarkable ideas on 
law and the rule of law, as Pietro Costa admirably portrayed
43, that it might be superfluous to 
reiterate.       
Initial formation of the rule of law flourished in the web of liberalism that it conformed 
two different groups of facts. On the one hand it corresponded with laissez faire principles in 
economy  and  politics,  such  as  right  of  property,  freedom  of  contract,  gold  standard  of 
currency, night watchman state and minimal or no regulation in economy. On the other hand, 
it  coped  with  political  legitimacy  problem  in  the  secularised  society,  which  was 
accompanying with so-called contractual ostentation of liberal individual, after the doom of 
the status society. But the liberal society, as such, entailed a crisis to the extent that it was 
indifferent to mass impoverishment of working class and emerging rivalry between capitalist 
states for re-distribution world geography. The liberal core of the procedural rule of law could 
no longer maintain under those twofold pressures whatsoever. Firstly, with due attention to 
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the prevalent legal policy, which reconcilable with the liberal rule of law, it depended on 
minimal  legislation  and  regulation,  as  maintained  until  Roman  Catholic  Relief  Act  in 
England, promulgated on 1829
44. The legislative quiescence and  codiphobia were inherent 
policy concerns of classical liberalism, even when some liberals still tried to maintain at the 
end of the nineteenth century
45 or today with regard to English or American reluctance for 
private law codification. However, very elaborately designed liberal governance in England 
could not remedy all harmful social consequences of capitalism, which manifested themselves 
as distrust with working class pauperism, unrest and criminalisation; the ready -made remedy 
was  to  reinforce  p enal  system  and  penitentiary  measures  whatever  compelled  to  pass 
legislative  acts.  Considerably  at  early  date, prior to  the industrial revolution,  George  I 
promulgated Waltham Black Act on 1723 which aimed to punish efficiently the crimes to 
property and person, but failed because of its Draconian character and severity
46. Apart from 
failure of the act aforesaid, working class disgust pervaded all industrial regions and cities, 
especially after Paterloo massacre on 1819, therefore such claims coupled with de mand for 
legislation and universal suffrage
47.  
The  fact  that  liberalism  was  generally  adversary  to  parliamentary  legislation  and 
codification, but Jeremy Bentham, as a radical (Whig) liberal, rigorously became exponent of 
parliamentary legislation in order to refine liberal order from remnants of paternalism. He 
defended legislation and civil law codification under guidance of four principles, namely as 
“subsistence”,  “abundance”,  “equality”  and  “security”,  with  prospecting  to  adjust  society 
complete  vision  of  liberalism
48. Meanwhile, British government was not enthusiastic for 
legislation  under  the  guidance  of  Burke’s  conservatism  and  that  it  feared  penetration  of 
revolutionary campaign and republicanism, which emanated from the Napoleonic Wars and 
from petit bourgeoisie, in the milieu of vulnerable British status quo. Under the Benthamite 
influence, English government prohibited working class organisations by means of 1824 and 
1825 Combination Acts, as corollary of radical liberalism. Aftermath, the British legislative 
policy was totally altered that the Whig government embarked upon extensive legislation after 
1830.  The  political  unrest  channelled  more  legitimated  political  campaigns  after  People’s 
Charter on 1832 and New-Tories victory, therefore the nexus of politico-legal system swayed 
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from radical liberalism to the approval of overall public opinion and “collectivism”. The new 
political  principles,  as  Dicey  expressed,  are  “extension  of  the  idea  of  protection”,  “the 
restriction  on  freedom  of  contract”,  “the  preference  for  collective  as  contrasted  with 
individual action, especially in the matter of bargaining” and “the equalisation of advantages 
among individuals possessed of unequal means for their attainment”
49. 
The change in British politics was a principal sway from the liberal rule of law to the 
substantive rule of law, as traditionally named “welfare state”, therefore judicial lawmaking 
was  incrementally  replaced  by  extensive  legislation.  Inasmuch  as  new  status  quo  was 
irreconcilable with liberal night watchman state, the governmental system assumed new task 
to mitigate working class grievance and to satisfy their demand for remuneration. In this 
milieu,  new  laws  in  favour  of  lower  class  people  were  injected  into  the  system,  that  is, 
primarily from 1840 onwards
50 which focused on ten hours working day (1847), to prevent 
food adulteration (1860), to regulate food and drug sales (1899), land law (1860 and 1881), 
free education to all countrymen (1891), housing for working class families (1851 and 1900), 
public health (1848 and 1875), subsidising poorer people (1894) etc. Albeit, Dicey’s term was 
“collectivism” for the new era, which roughly  referred to  social  justice, the development 
reflected a remarkable alteration in the content of the rule of law that it reflected new political 
equilibrium, as radical change in essential character of the ongoing political attitude. First of 
all, the governmental system was obliged to reconcile working class whatsoever the outcome 
of political strife under the upsurge of labourer’s class-consciousness. The other was drastic 
change in the functioning of the law that it swayed on the one hand from protection of liberal 
individual to class conciliation and on the other hand from established formal or procedural 
justice to the regulation, pragmatism and importance of parliamentary legislation. Thirdly, the 
change accompanied democratisation of political life to the extent that polyarchy expanded at 
any rate, which was consequence of naturalisation of subaltern social strata. Despite there was 
some punctuations, which might exert counter effect on democratisation, the era of welfare 
state  or  the  substantive  rule  of  law  is  very  likely  parallel  with  expansion  of  polyarchy, 
especially in the second half of the 20
th century
51.  
In the legal domain, we must point that legal positivism was congruent with regulatory 
state where attributed a critical role to the law which metamorphosed it from to safeguard 
free-born individual to maintain  status quo by means of commands of sovereign
52, anyhow 
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interplayed  with  the  idea  of  parliamentary  sovereignty.  We  must  add  that,  as  Bentham 
devoted himself for expounding on the control society and panopticon, which relied on an 
idea about malleability of human society. Notwithstanding this extensive change, the liberal 
nexus of the law remained, but was veiled by a regulatory wrap. It is worthwhile to ask why 
the grounds of the aforesaid shift how any longer depending on a radical change of capitalist 
mode of production under excessively socialised labour process  or a domesticated liberal 
ideology.  Concurrent  with  working  class  political  uprising,  the  society  became  more 
resembled as the mass society in spite of its official conception was society of individuals, so 
distorted image in comparison with actual condition. As expounded by Gustave le Bon at the 
end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  mass  society  cannot  be  understood  by  philosophical 
explanations or ideological daydreams of liberalism, nonetheless it can be apprehended by a 
science (namely, by sociology) and might be governed by sophisticated means of control
53. 
As Foucault specifically delved into inner relationship between discipline and  panopticon in 
correction house and army
54, it was initially embarked upon in employment and workhouse, 
reached its zenith in modern factory system
55. In this context, I must lastly express that the 
individual  was  gradually  replaced  by  corporate  personality  in  the  capitalist  mode   of 
production and social setting of human individual, which yielded to evaporation of “private 
sphere” of the liberal society and solely survived in legal definition. 
When transformation of capitalist society unfolded itself as mass society, the change was 
unintentional  that  capital  accumulation  process  yielded  intensification  and  centralisation 
capital  and  sequentially  proliferated  mass  of  propertyless  labourers  and  unemployed 
population
56. The transformation, such as, was remarkable at the end of nineteen th century 
which reached an unprecedented stage of capitalist society, whatsoever monopoly capitalism 
was widespread. In this milieu, the exponents of free competition in United Kingdom and 
United  States,  eventually  grudged  this  “unwilling”  consequence,  but  realistically  adjusted 
themselves, because monopolistic or state-sponsored competition in the global sphere coerced 
them
57. Meanwhile, competition of big business breezed through competition of sovereign 
states, because interests of companies were already identical with dominant politics of their 
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homeland countries, which were paving the road of the world war.  Consequently, the all 
liberal canon on economy, politics and finance dramatically faded away wherever government 
regulation, protectionism and privileged custom tariffs became prevalent
58. 
I hope that the reader can remind the abovementioned opinion, which pointed inner 
relationship between the rule of law and national unification. In the last quarter of nineteenth 
century, capitalist countries rigorously reinvented nationality, whereof working classes were 
naturalised for not only for gratification of their universal suffrage claims, but also they 
seemed prospective soldiers of the future combats with rival states in order to control markets 
and colonies, especially after success of Napoléon Bonaparte’s national army displayed. Most 
important aspect of the development was German state-mandated capitalism and its inner 
relations with nation-building process. After the Napoléonic wars, German unification was 
accomplished according to a plan, which proposed the first time by Friedrich List on 1822
59 
where the author expounded his capitalist development plan under the headlight of national 
economy  consideration.  Despite  its  history  took  place  in  same  fluctua tions,  German 
capitalism  developed  under  the  mastering  of  government  that,  contrary  to  the  British 
capitalism,  Imperial  Germany  allotted  and  mobilised  all  national  prowess.  Government 
husbanding  capitalism  of  Germany  consciously  harnessed  all  viable  means  where  state 
mandated monopoly enterprises were crucial, anyhow was reproached from liberal purview
60. 
Therefore,  German  capitalism  was  launched  in  conscious  manner  how  coupled  nation 
building and economic development in a manner to recourse nationality, cul ture, natural 
sciences, universities and theoretical oddity in legal theories. The fact that a liberal frankly or 
equivocally  expresses  her  or  his  remorse  to  the  state  monopolies  or  every  kind  of 
monopolisation  in  market,  but  Imperial  Germany  plainly  embar ked  on  cartelisation  in 
strategic sectors and that overtly established government -made kartelgesetz
61.  I must lastly 
point  that  Imperial  Germany  virtually  quitted  the  hostility  to  the  labourers,  which  was 
contrary  to  the  traditional  attitude  of  capitalist  governments.  Therefore,  as  having  been 
concluded a resolution  between Prince  Bismarck and famous “socialist” leader  Ferdinand 
Lassalle, after negotiation between 1863 and 1864, government unilaterally granted universal 
suffrage and welfare measures to all German countrymen, such as, pensions, working hours, 
                                                           
58 John A. Hobson, International Trade: An Application of Economic Theory, 2003, 58-68. 
59 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, Trans. by, Sampson S. Lloyd, 1909. 
60 Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, A Study of Its Monopoly Organisations and Their Control by the State, 
2001; Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and Industrial Revolution 2003.  
61 Levy (note 60) 132, 134-139, 147. 20 
housing  etc., but  the same  government  did  not forget to  pass anti-socialist  legislation on 
1878
62.  
As a conclusive remark, I can express that welfare state was a comprehensive system of 
policies and measures which aimed reconciliation with masses via concessions to the working 
classes, stiffening the statecraft, social solidarity and becoming robust in international sphere. 
Welfare state transformed established nexus of the rule of law that it adjusted to   a new 
political  equilibrium  and  therefore  judge -made  law  submerged  under  predominance  of 
legislative acts. It must be renamed as “the substantive rule of law”, of which substantive 
content of law surpassed the allocated tasks of liberal night watchman state. Normally, liberal 
countries,  such  as  England  and  United  States,  accomplished  welfare  measures  within 
regulatory  bonds,  but  German  tradition  was  a  bit  awkward  that  its  rechtsstaat  was  more 
dynamic  and  constructive,  which  assumed  an  extra  duty  for  national  unification  and 
modernisation, additional to the abovementioned commitments of the rule of law. German 
legal  consciousness  grounded  on  the  unity  between  state  and  individual  (as  Jellinek says 
Teutonic consideration), which presumed an identity between the two poles, whereas Anglo-
American approaches overtly or tacitly maintained the tension between civil society and state, 
inherited from liberal legacy
63. Corollary of this idea, scope and purpose of the law in German 
consideration conferred legal character to the state and government that it equated legal and 
political actions, by which the identity of law subsequently equated with politics. Moreover, 
referring to the idea of nation or people, the law may avail ethical property, which adversary 
to the liberal idea whatsoever demarcated the domains of ethics and law. Under the normal 
course events, historicist approach to law and relying on its national trait is not totally 
unfamiliar to the origins of common law according to its piecemeal accomplishment in  the 
Middle Ages, but it yielded serious consequences when coupled with mass society and 
equation law with politics.  In this humbler space, I cannot dispute all constellations of the 
idea, but I must point that the tension between the liberal (procedural) rule of law and welfare 
state  (i.  e.  the  substantive  rule  of  law)  was  mitigated  when  we  consider  the  German 
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sozialrechtsstaat. Henceforth the latter inherently existed in the rechtsstaat, because both of 
them are considered as manifestation of the idea of the law
64.   
 
IV. Globalisation and the Rule of Law 
As  regards  history  of  civilization,  from  its  very  beginning  from  primitive  societies,  the 
twofold human spaces may be dichotomised that they were, firstly, centred on spatialisation 
of the known world by way of political power and territorializing it as outcome of non-market 
coercion and, secondly, re-spatialisation and territorialisation of world geography by way of 
market expansion under the economic power of capital, which wields peripheral locations, on 
behalf of monopoly companies
65. Since, capitalism has an inherent predisposition to spread 
far-reaching market relations all over the globe, even where in some territories modes of 
production are not yet capitalist. The “globalisation” is relatively novel concept that it denotes 
globally working capitalism and its subsystems which depending on flow of goods, finance, 
technology,  knowledge,  territorial  organisations  and  of  business  customs,  the  all  those 
novelties are crosscutting the territory-bounded political bodies and nation-states
66. Following 
to  the  unilateral  circulation  of  capital  anyhow  determined  by  capital  ownership,  the 
globalisation opened a series of circulations which can be enumerated as material exchange 
(including  trade,  tenancy,  wage -labour,  fee-for-service  and  capital  accumulation), power 
exchanges, symbolic exchanges (which is dissemination of cultural symbols and information), 
arrangement of localities (which determined by global flow), unravelling the established local 
arrangements and political centres at the expense of centralism in politics and culture which 
are totally stimulated by unintentional working of capitalism
67. Albeit his some benevolent 
ideas  on  the  globalisation,  Anthony  Giddens  fairly  determined  fou r  dimensions  in  the 
globalisation process that they comprised capitalist world economy, international division of 
labour, military order of the world and the system of nation states
68. It seems that capitalist 
world economy predetermined scope and depth of  globalisation. As Wallerstein denoted, 
globalisation is a specific form of worldwide networks of civilisations which divides world 
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empires  and  capitalist  world  economy,  hereby  both  of  them  embodies  non-egalitarian 
relations between centres and peripheries
69.  
Today, when we talk about the globalisation, we indicate international market, networked 
relations  and  economy -based  hierarchies  of  post -soviet  era.  Thus,  it  is  last  epoch  of 
globalisations  which  was  interpreted  as  submerging  into  different  eras.  Among  others, 
Therborn hypothesised six waves of succeeding globalisations that they comprise all history 
of civilisations: (1) Diffusion of religions and transcontinental civilizations, whereby key 
factor of process was domination of imperial bodies; (2) Europe an colonialism, after 1492 
which demarcated with mercantile interests and colonial plunder; (3) Global thrust resulting 
from intra-European power struggles which distinguished with succession wars and Franco 
British wars in 18
th Century, which culminated with Napoleonic Wars until 1815; (4) The age 
of trans-oceanic bulk trade and mass immigration until 1918; (5) shrinking of world trade 
after First World War which was a diverse wave as de-globalisation (whereby, abandonment 
of gold standard in currency and division of first and second worlds); (6) The current era 
which began with end of the cold war (the decay of socialist system must be added)
70. The 
first wave remarkably differs from others that it depended on political domination unto 
economic resources of agricultural mode of production, but, at the last resort, its extension 
was  determined  fecundity  of  the  geography,  which  only  limited  by  technical  and 
administrative  capabilities  of  the  age.  The  other  waves  are  direct  outcomes  of  capital 
ownership which in the milieu, either primeval accumulation of capital or exigencies of 
capital ownership on behalf of the centred zones of capitalism or at the expense of periphery 
countries, i. e., colonies or dependent regions. 
The  globalisation is determined by market  relationship and expansionary nature of 
capitalist mode of production, even where it is disputed with denoting cultural consequences 
or other aspects that they remould cultures through destruction of local and global dichotomy 
or  to  unsettle  pre -established  time  and  space  relations.  The  fact  that  the  last  wave  of 
globalisation, how, at present, we plainly say “the globalisation”, was embarked upon at the 
end  of  dissolution  of  socialist  world.  It  seems  triumph  of  liberalism  that  it  disentangled 
capitalism from the non-market retraints in expansion of actual markets or to recuperate new 
markets already outer to the capitalist control. Therefore, the globalisation is outcome of an 
impersonal  victor and that, apart from  decisions  of policymakers in  the global market; it 
works as dehumanised manner and in toto devoid of forecasting an itinerary. In this context, 
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we  can  frankly  say  that  the  globalisation  is  outcome  of  hyper-developed  capitalism 
whatsoever is unintentional and uncontrollable, whatsoever cannot be humanised. During the 
era of welfare state since last quarter of 19
th century up to 1980’s, liberal ideology submerged 
beneath the welfare state that it was dormant,  but not being deserted. Furthermore, some 
liberal partisans eventually warmed up it, in order to not desert it to oblivion or obsolescence. 
Von Mises, celebrated Austrian liberal, frankly defended 19
th century type liberalism on 1927 
who alleged that liberalism is only viable ideology of capitalism, in lock, stock and barrel and 
of  its  admonitions  must  be  pursued  for  economy
71. Similarly, Hayek radically raised his 
objections to all social justice measures and planned economy, as detrimental point of view 
favouring the classical liberalism, when shortly after the well -known  “Beveridge  Report” 
issued on 1942, whereby he alleged similarity between the welfare state and slavery
72. We 
must add that Milton Friedman (on 1962) or Henry Hazlitt (on 1989)
73  preached similar 
liberal  precepts,  to  the  degree  to  which  flattering  taxpayer  entrepreneurs,  promising 
devastation of social justice and preaching shrinking government and deregulation. Despite 
the fact that welfare state or  sozialrechtsstaat was not only means of sum total of the social 
justice but also recourse in the great depression in order to surmount shortage of demand, 
according  to  the  Keynesian  doctrine  in  spite  of  liberalism  staked  out  American  political 
ideology. I can lastly say that the globalisation, as ideology, is outcome of insurmountable 
stage of liberalism (i. e., neo-liberalism), whereby radical liberalism was initial ideology of 
American  big  business,  therefore  it  factually  coerced  to  the  globe  (to  satellite  states  and 
others) when its main adversary (the socialist bloc) dramatically faded away.          
Nonetheless the comprehensiveness of contemporary legal domain and its constellations, 
which  rooted  to  the  popular  approval  and  democracy,  capitalism,  as  leitmotif  of  the 
globalisation,  determines  outer  limits  of  power  allocation,  whether  in  legal  or  political 
domains. Apart from the ongoing experience of legal history through the liberal rule of law 
and substantive development of the welfare state engraved our legal imagination, the legal 
system  and  judiciary  of  any  capitalist  country  in  contemporary  world  are  not  fully 
autonomous  from  those  outer  limits  of  power,  emanated  from  economic  base.  Albeit  his 
interpretation  on  the  three  period  of  globalisation  is  partially  different  my  state  of  mind, 
Duncan Kennedy marvellously summarised components of legal domain very likely to the 
unilineal evolution conception of 19
th century
74, but his legal development, which responsive 
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to the human exigencies, is not incessant. Whereas the constituents of first (between 1850-
1914) and second (between 1900-1968)  periods, which roughly correspond with the liberal 
and substantive rule of law development,  refer the route of advancement with respecting  
human exigencies, human dignity and democratisation, but third stage, which annexed to the 
end  of  the  article,  mystifies  the  deterioration  of  vested  rights  of  subaltern  social  strata. 
Anyhow, we can match miscellaneous components of the legal system, whereby attaching 
their origins  to  some historical  periods, but  we must take together comprehensive life of 
society under the light of crucial aspects when we debate the rule of law problem. Therefore, I 
intend to take seriously merit or demerit of its some essential aspects under a few numbers of 
headings. 
 
1.The quintessence of the neo-liberal rule of law 
The dominant legal purview of the globalisation is being expressed by the neo-liberal thinkers 
in legal or non-legal occasions that they revisit to the canon of classical liberalism. F. A. 
Hayek is conspicuous author of the neo-liberal legal imagination that he considers society 
according  to  his  social  Darwinist  stance.  To  the  extent  to  which  concerned,  Hayek 
disregarded public concern, favoured recalcitrant individualism, whereof he equated nomos 
and  judge-made  law,  as  a  recourse  for  safeguarding  individual,  property  and  freedom  of 
contract,  whereas  he  was  overtly  reluctant  for  legislation  (which  he  said  thesis)  when 
especially favoured to the working class and claims for social justice
75. In the same way, but 
more radicalised version of neo -liberal point of view is belonging to Richar d Posner who 
avowedly preached anarchical liberalism for the sake of commutative justice. He revisited 
Benthamite pain and pleasure dichotomy, but, in more radicalised form that he alleged 
“wealth maximisation” of individual instead of Benthamite principle on maximal happiness of 
greatest number of people
76. Corollary of this idea, transaction became main lever of justice 
(i. e. commutative and corrective justices) in the manner how there is no room for non-market 
goods and public services. Posner’s legal ideology is depending on eulogising “efficiency” (as 
borrowed conception from microeconomics), classical common law system (which indifferent 
to  distributive  justice  and  social  justice)  and  shrunk  government  vis-à-vis  to  the  liberal 
politics. Posner’s minimal government is probably more shrunken than precepts for night 
watchman state arguments of the Adam Smith’s liberalism. Therefore he proposes political 
institutions of the heroic age of Greeks, that’s monarchical system which thinly balanced as 
separation of powers between basileus (king), boule (association of peerage) in the social 
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milieu  of  citizenship  of  household  (oikos)  headmen
77.  Posner’s  point  of  view  is  not 
unprecedented, but cordially expressed with flattering veneration to property owners that his 
political bias is entrenched with legal assessment through impartial legal concepts. Brennan 
and Buchannan urged similar conception in the economic and politico-legal domains that they 
relied on Wicksellian idea in economy which set forth all economic decisions might depend 
on unanimity. Therefore, according to the Buchannan, any decision, legal or political, when 
concerned  to  economy,  can  only  be  viable  according  to  the  unanimity  of  all  actors  of 
economic transactions
78. In other words, to the extent to which the question at pose concerned 
to democracy, any deliberation, political discretion and legal ruling should be repel led when 
thwarts the non-electoral constraints of economic transactions and property owners; that is, 
any legal ruling or political discretion can be viable if, only if it conforms the will of all 
individual property owners, unanimously. 
 
2. Rule of investors, instead of the rule of law 
Having been put forward many times, capital circulation in trans-border regions, transnational 
area or boundless on the globe is not entirely anew phenomena, that is inherent propensity of 
capitalism, notwithstanding it was fully disclosed after 1980
79. The proponents of free trade 
policies had been fully cognisant of such phenomena since 19
th century Manchester School, 
but some restraints curbed or fully dispelled such attitude, as consequences of the world wars 
and  proletarian  or  national  revolutions.  When  the  United  States  of  America  mandated  to 
establish the new system of currency at the of Second World War on 1944 via Bretton Woods 
agreement, 44 national governments recognised United States currency in order to adjust their 
national currencies. The system established together with regulatory institutions and rules of 
conduct  which  were  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  World  Bank  and  The  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); whereby the system prevented protectionism, trade 
barriers  and  dumping  (the  related  anti-dumping  code  enacted  on  1967).  The  system  was 
trimming the United States hegemony in the world economy, but concealed its spirit with 
constraints of Keynesian policy and that it could not be matured under the impediments of the 
socialist  bloc,  anti-colonialist  upsurge  and  non-alignment  movement  after  Bandung 
Conference on 1955. The Bretton Woods System was incurred some convulsions and that it 
was  relinquished  on  1970  by  the  United  States,  the  principal  founder,  but  organisational 
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umbrella remained and regulations were not deserted. However, the system could not entirely 
achieve the purpose of its founder; it paved the way for monopoly control of world economy. 
In this milieu a series of transnational organisations were founded, among which Benelux 
Union on 1948 or European Union (with Maastricht Treaty on 1992), after initial step with 
Paris Treaty on 1950
80. 
Inasmuch as I conceive, the United States had planned to master world economy and 
politics when Bretton Woods conference summoned. Albeit the main idea of her initial plan, 
it failed with demerit of counter effects which were mainly political outcome of existence of 
the socialist bloc, political achievement of the third world countries, oil prices and econ omic 
recession in  1970’s.  In  this  milieu, neo-liberalism  was  seeming indispensable recourse in 
order  to  throw  away  economic  recession
81. By the way, several countervailing political 
dynamics were in decay that on the one hand working class movement and oppo sition of 
leftist political parties dramatically faltered, on the other hand the United States mastered 
some  coup  d’état’s  in  1970’s  and  at  the  eve  of  1980’s  in  various  important  peripheral 
countries in order to impose them neo-liberal policies or pushed some others to liberalism. 
Meanwhile,  notwithstanding  her  political  discourse  ostensibly  hinged  on  democracy,  the 
United  States  preferred  to  establish  close  relationships  with  undemocratic  governments 
apropos of reserved attitude of neo-liberal writers about democracy
82. The fact that in the 
same period there were some signals which heralded fading away of socialist countries. 
Eventually, after a series of roundtables since 1963 up to 1979, which summoned by United 
States, the Uruguay Round in 1986 -1993 yielded with establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on 1995, the regulatory board for neo -liberal deregulation of world 
trade. The Uruguay Round settled miscellaneous issues of world trade, which embraced 
goods,  services  or  agriculture  sectors,  int ellectual  property,  tariff  or  non -tariff  barriers, 
restraints on trade, abolition of dumping agreements and government subsidies. Subsequently, 
the  WTO  became  representative  of  the  GATT,  furnished  with  a  consensus  rules  and 
centralised dispute resolution board which backed with viable sanctions. Therefore, member 
states of the WTO and the GATT proclaimed their commitment to adjust national legal 
systems and that they would undertake to implement the agreements in their domestic legal 
systems. The guidelines hereafter is the agreements which are known as the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on 
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Textiles  and  Clothing,  the  Agreement  on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade,  the  Agreement  on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-
Dumping),  the  Agreement  on  Rules  of  Origin,  the  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and 
Countervailing Measures, the Agreement on Safeguards, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(including Trade in Counterfeit Goods) and lastly the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing  the  Settlement  of  Disputes.  In  addition,  the  Uruguay  Round  yielded  a  draft 
agreement,  named  as  the  Multilateral  Agreement  on  Investment  (MAI)  which  ultimately 
aimed to mandate deregulation and privatisation in national economies, that they are being 
considered as the elimination of all national regulations, emanated from Keynesian economic 
policy  and  the  welfare  state
83.  Today  the MAI seems  failed
84,  but  its  logic  resides  in 
unleashed deregulation in the world trade.  
The WTO system, by and large, is implementing regulatory (aiming deregulation) curb 
and enforcement mechanism of world trade that its commitments impaired constitutional and 
legal constraints of party states. Moreover there are other pervasive multilateral instruments 
which named as the “bilateral investment treaties” (BIT’s) that those are previous from WTO 
system, but proliferated after 1989. As Schineiderman studied, he approximately detected 
1700 BIT’s on 2000 and 2500 on 2008, which may be more in today
85. The BIT’s are bilateral 
instruments  aiming to  implement foreign direct investment  (FDI) that they are seemingly 
stipulating reciprocal rights and liabilities, as modelled like legal provisions of international 
treaties, but, in action, emanate ex parte immunities in favour of investors because of their 
overriding  position.  In  this  context,  the  BIT’s  curb  constitutional  and  legal  provisions  of 
investment  importing  countries,  by  which  they  rule  over  laws  and  regulations  of  such 
countries which contain dispute resolution rules and agencies, and that they also enjoy GATS 
and other agreements of WTO. Schneiderman frankly expressed that the BIT’s implemented 
constitution-like rules of investment which are indifferent to public welfare considerations of 
party states and their developmental achievements. Moreover, BIT’s are very likely to the 
constitutions of capital owners, which are similar to the Buchannan’s economic constitution, 
because constraining the future by way of taking provisions in order to safeguard investor 
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against confiscation and nationalisation, even though the party states justly indemnify the cost 
of assets and other indemnities.  
Schneiderman pointed that investment rules have constitutional character that they are 
backed by more vigorously than internal law. First of all, it seems that all member states of 
WTO and party states of BIT’s voluntarily promised to implement stipulations which enacted 
in  multilateral  or  bilateral  agreements.  Secondly,  they  are  compelled  to  consent,  because 
surrendered implementation of their development under the aegis of international business 
circles, probably by their irredeemable economic condition, ideological choice or corruption. 
Furthermore, another remarkable fact is that the underdeveloped or developing countries very 
radically  carried  on  such  rules  of  investment  in  their  domestic  legal  systems  by  way  of 
legislative revisions and constitutional amendments. Schneiderman also pointed that some 
Latin  American  countries  (Colombia  on  1991or  Mexico  1994)  legislated  constitutional 
amendments to safeguard privatisation
86. As an example, I can personally point my homeland 
country (The Republic of Turkey) where a constitutional amendment was annexed a provision 
to Section 47, on 1999 that it uphold privatisation of public assets. Examples may probably be 
proliferated, but most remarkable one is Slovenian Constitution of 1991, which broadly 
envisaged privatisation. Slovenia excessively perpetrated privatisation policy, unbelievably 
exceeding economic purposes that it reached privatisation of public security, intelligence, 
judicial execution and entirely judiciary
87. 
Investment rules and privatisation, aforesaid, may be consented from point of view of 
liberal ideology of law, but their functioning destructive with regard to human condition in 
the global south. The globalisation very seriously deepened income inequality, as United 
Nations Development Programme disclosed on 1996 that purchasing power of 258 richest 
people in all over the world was equal to combined income of poorest 45 per cent of the world 
population which numbered as 2.3 billion people
88. Apart from the globalisation extremely 
radicalised inequality between regions and social classes, as pointed by Werlhof, 500 biggest 
transnational (multinational) companies in the year 2000 were controlling 80 per cent of total 
investment all around the globe
89. In the same way, after industrial property  safeguarded, 
39.000 firms were controlling 270.000 firms which totally valued as 2.7 trillion USD, almost 
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all high-tech user firms on the globe
90. There is a tremendous number of statistical evidence 
that they refer not only inhuman inequality between north   and south or certain cleavage 
between life expectancy, but also global inequality is a decisive impediment for economic 
development of underdeveloped countries. By and large, overwhelming majority of lawyers 
are political liberals, anyhow indifferent to t he economic issues, but they must notice that 
social order can no longer maintain in low life expectancy and carelessness to human dignity. 
Lastly, we remember the main characteristic of the rule of law that it featured as to limit 
political by way of chec ks and balance system on the legal ground. This main character 
upside down after the neo-liberal globalisation where centrifugal forces, the checking power 
of bourgeoisie became more powerful than governments, while democracy claims of working 
classes are more subtle than the last two centuries. When Evgeny Pashukanis, Soviet jurist, 
criticised bourgeois legal form with respecting commodity fetishism (of Marx) veiling to 
surplus value exploitation, he alleged that legal form  is similarly veiling to bourgeo is 
domination by means of ostensible autonomy of legal domain in capitalist society
91. Despite 
we allege pros and cons justifications against legal outcomes of the globalisation, today not 
only the rule of law, but also condition of legal system, in general, is poorer than Pashukanis’s 
criticisms.  
 
3. Private lawmaking and undemocratic legal pluralism 
The globalisation unleashed inherent inclination in the legal imagination of capital owners, 
whose intent is unbounded by law in his dealings or other commitments, except her or his 
matter-of-fact involvements or promises. The legal imagination of any individual capitalist 
incessantly dreams to release from government regulation and non-market constraints, such as 
national interest of his or her of own government or other governments, whatever compatible 
with  inspiring  shrunken  government.  After  neo-liberalism,  the  capitalist  imagination 
disentangled from all public policy concerns and political limitations where the new legal 
development yielded governance between corporate investors or their proxies in national or 
international level as outcome of deregulation policy, instead of democratic deliberation. In 
this milieu, we confront new type of legal domain that it comprises private lawmaking which 
named as soft law (in national or international sphere) or with more brilliant name modern lex 
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mercatoria
92.  Levit  and  Snyder  separately  delved  into  that  private  lawmaking  take  place 
among investors and capital owners that its main objective is regulating trade by means of 
privately made rules, in devoid of government regulation. National or international corporate 
bodies of capital flow are able to implement bottom-up rules of trade which concerned to the 
matters of their transaction in formal way they are unbounded by law or any constitutional 
limitation.  The  bottom-up  rules  are  depending  on  experience  and  customs  of  market,  as 
traditionally enunciated in the private international law, which ostensibly rely on wills of 
trading partners, but in practice it is taken place under superimposition of wills of mandating 
big business. Their softness is depending on matter-of-fact equilibrium that they cannot be put 
into limitation  of the legal system  of the country  or may eventually deviate without  any 
respect  to  formal  principles  and  ground  rules.  In  international  level,  the  soft  law  means 
myriad international instruments
93, in practice, lacking formal properties of law, which are 
unpromising for implementing public disclosure, formality, accountability and predictability.           
Private lawmaking is depending on a longer history than the last wave of globalisation. 
Apart from historical roots of the private international law, American business and finance 
industry, in general, were very arduous to institute private lawmaking ac cording to classical 
liberal state of mind. We can find that NCCUSL (National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws) or, in other name, Uniform Law Commission is a kind of NGO which 
depending on remote past, as dated at 1892. The other non -government organisation is ALI 
(American Law Institute) is having been recorded that it implemented Uniform Sales Act on 
1906
94. Since 1906 the Institute prepared more than 200 laws on commercial transactions or 
investments and, as Snyder expressed, Uniform Commercial Code had been legislated as joint 
venture of the two organisations. Furthermore, the soft law comprises a number of legal 
instruments which enacted very few persons, cannot be deemed corporate bodies. Berne 
Union has been a kind of lobby of finance , since 1934 which has secrecy but regulated all 
credit  insurance  issues,  summoned  as  likely  gentlemen’s  dialogue
95.  Similarly,  Visa  and 
MasterCard, only the two companies regulate credit cards sector, whereas De Beers, the only 
one company, regulates diamond market according to the religious law of Jews. When we 
entirely regard international soft law, the development may be fairly interpreted according to 
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deconstructive philosophy or in favour of other interpretative approaches
96, whereas the law is 
not the  area for proliferation of philosophical or aesthetic ideas, moreover it must be in 
achievement to provide basic needs of humankind.   
Tremendous number of legal scholars eulogise legal consequence of the globalisation 
with aspiring more humanitarian world which should have released from national bond, more 
freed and fitting to cosmopolitan ideal
97. The dream is being prolonged to transnational world, 
but its guarantees are totally lacking, because there is no constraint to impose capital owner to 
behave in pursuance for public order, human dignity and welfare of all. The globalisation 
debates oscillate between inequality and democracy problems that nobody can propose a 
viable solution for both of them in the present state of affairs. Apart from its viability  for 
monopoly capitalists, the international soft law is not only lacking public disclosure and 
democratic questionability or accountability, but also quiescent for eliminating poverty and 
inequality, notwithstanding that the effectivity of capital investme nt  is vital for such a 
problem. Regarding to the inner relation between notorious (somebody think) “formalness” 
and the rule of law, adjudication was key element which safeguarded supremacy of law by 
way  of  public  monopoly.  On  the  contrary,  emerging  means  of  extra-legal  mechanism  of 
dispute  resolution,  which  are  exclusively  stipulated  in  FDI  rules  or  WTO  agreements, 
radically divorced from public justice consideration, anyhow cannot controllable by appellate 
courts or even cannot be challenged before judiciary. Therefore, such mechanisms displace 
public character of legal domain that it cannot be deemed administrative of justice anyhow 
contrary to the entire legal experience of humankind. Consequentially, I can frankly express 
that the globalisation would be equated with decline of the rule of law; instead, it must be 
considered as governance between capital owners
98.     
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4. Political nexus of the rule of law is totally fading away 
Regarding to the early development of the rule of law, it came into effect in certain political 
condition that it could be materialised in the national union and sovereign state which took 
place separation of powers with ubiquity of law in civic society. In this milieu, nation-state 
was the political context within which the rule of law developed that it was accompanied by 
civic virtues, citizenship of the state, republicanism and democratisation. In the meantime, the 
nation-state  fused  with  political  membership  of  citizen  which  relied  on  cultural 
homogenisation and re-established identity with due regard to civic life, at the expense of 
ethnic or religious community affiliations
99. By the way, the liberal rule of law advanced in 
actual or taken for granted society of individuals where the social system seemed to have 
balanced according to the dichotomy of private and public spheres. As a matter of fact, when 
the society  of  individu als  faded  away,  mass  society  was  treated to  control  by  way  of 
disciplinary devices. By the same token, the society evolved to a new stage that it became 
scene  of  class  conflict  and  democratisation  claims.  In  this  milieu,  the  national  society 
remained, furthermore stiffened under the unease from warlike competition between states 
and plainly hostility among them. The globalisation in economy fairly impinged on nation -
state
100, probably did not entirely abolish, but very seriously maimed when crosscut it by way 
of pushing to withdraw from discretion and adjudication in economy-related matters. Despite 
the fact that sovereign state was weakened by transnational companies and global governance 
of capitalism, it cannot be limited again by law, as having been reckon ed in constitutional 
limitation by law or separation of powers
101. It is apt to think that ultra-minimal government 
cannot bear a multiplied limitation by law or other countervailing political dynamics, which 
might be only arisen within national society. The  foreseeable outcome is to sway dictatorial 
means of government when political situation become unmanageable.     
The globalisation realigned structural components of capitalist society that they already 
seemed relatively stable, such as vocational and pol itical roles of social groups, classes, 
localities  or  community  affiliations.  Apart  from  residual  forms  of  pre -modern  societal 
relations, capitalist society relocated structural components in market -based relations which 
manifested totally comprehensive system of markets in economy, hierarchies in politics and 
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administration and networks of vocational or social relations
102. The globalisation is primarily 
economy based phenomena, but decomposed all beforehand social settings, therefore changed 
it toward anew spatial relations. The globalisation does not exert a blue print model of society 
for all societies and relational categories, in modes of production, consumer behaviour, 
politics and recreation that it caused spatialisation which partially adjusted to com mon 
crossroad of role attachment and relational place of social settings. Whereas, the capitalist 
firm in the classical liberalism age was subjecting territorial sovereignty of state that it was 
conditioned by political role of government, it pledged to sa feguard capital in an impartial 
involvement and legal restriction, according to the ideological orbit of the liberalism. A 
capitalist or an investor was therefore liable to the certain legal requirements of the rule of law 
which  ubiquitously  postulated  in  constitutional  system.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  age  of 
monopoly capitalism, state was fettered by the interests of the capitalist investor which 
gradually pushed state to confer his inclusion to governmental discretion, as considering the 
identity between interest of nation and monopoly firms. 
The globalisation of present epoch has relocated the order of things that governance 
between monopoly capitalist companies and government has been transformed to worldwide 
governance between companies, governments and  their organisational umbrella, as having 
been instigated by WTO or World Bank. Indeed, those states are not equal in the milieu of 
disproportionate regionalisation of homelands of capital concentration which is obvious when 
we glance at geographical location of their headquarters and central organs of companies. In 
the same way, global policy concerns are shared in a congruent pattern under supremacy of 
company  headquarters  which  subsequently  denote  unequal  regionalisation  on  behalf  of 
developed countries of the global north
103. The globalisation opened a way to re -establish 
spatial involvements of firms that it surpasses previous spaces of political geography. This 
relocation means reallocation of spaces and localities, as named spatialisation that it seriously 
rearticulates  centre  and  periphery  relations.  By  the  way,  spatialisation  is  not  plainly 
redistribution of geography or as pointed by Swyngedouw, spatiality denotes geographical 
scale  which  “perpetually  redefined,  contested  and  restructured  in  terms  of  their  extent, 
content, relative importance and interrelations”
104. Such spatialisation is ability to create new 
localities or impair for own part of abler to do that it means ability to annul limitations of 
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space,  therefore  new  localities  are  rescaled  according  to  the  unintentional  route  of  the 
globalisation, whereof local is renamed with a coined term of “glocal”
105. Global firms and 
financial flow localised globe according to the market opportunities, reliability to the labour 
force,  sources  of  raw  materials  and  prospective  clients  or  shareholders  whereby  their 
managerial staffs are very likely plenipotentiary cadré on behalf of investors, henceforth, not 
equally treating their metropolises with subordinate localities
106. Taken together the WTO 
system, the BIT’s, FDI commitments and unequal distribution of wealth, as Werlhof pointed, 
the new world order manifests itself as an awkward model of colonisation that it has only one 
difference with old colonialism whereby this time, colonies are localities and belonging to 
transnational companies
107. In this milieu, legal systems of the territorial states seems very 
likely to the environmental factor that they are burdens or negotiable impediments from the 
point  of  view  of  samurai -like  ceo’s  or  authorized  cadré’s  of  37.000  transnational 
companies
108.          
Lastly, we must glance at political prospects about how viability of the system in national 
and international spheres. The globalisation aroused in a certain political context that to some 
extent it was already imbued with outcomes of centennial experience of democratisation and 
certain degree of polyarchy anyhow. The fact that political indifference grew up after 1950’s 
in the western countries, as some political scientists alleged or observed in decayed political 
strife of working classes, but their vested rights were remaining. As regards, territorial states 
were maiming after new economic spatialisation, there was similar process in politics that 
political groups were reshaped according to new spaces and their networks. It is obvious that 
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politics, as a super-structure component, nurture from certain cultural patterns, milieus and 
ideological achievement which are totally surrounding by culture. Capitalism used to be a 
very privileged social formation before the globalisation which was capable of proliferating 
ideological articulation both of beneficial to dominant politics or its foes. Conversely, cultural 
aspect of the globalisation is totally curbed by consumerism and corporate culture of business 
which manifests passive reformism, hybrid or barren social achievements and indifference to 
the  revolutionary  ideas.  When  the  globalisation  stimulated  glocal  scales,  it  maintained  as 
revoking national traits of territory based culture, whereby revitalisation of communities and 
community based cultural networks. Those cultural milieus aim to embody daily concerns of 
communal aggregations, but not represent vintage point of view of constituents’, because they 
are reflecting hybridisations or mélanges which engendered under supremacy of the gist of 
global culture (i. e. cultural imperialism)
109    
All  previous  democracy  experience  depended  on  territoriality  of  politics,  whereby 
democracy was accomplished within inclusive space of political society, therefore to the 
extent  to  which  de mocratisation  took  place,  it  was  a  national  achievement.  After  the 
globalisation, on the one hand, private sphere colonised public sphere as consequential 
outcome of invincible monopoly capital, on the other hand, subaltern political groupings or 
quasi-groups of identity politics arouse detrimental to the territoriality and national culture of 
states. In this milieu, identity politics and participatory democracy are exciting ideas instead 
of  representative  democracy  and  deliberation  in  nation -based  society,  where  small  size 
political interest groups and their NGO based unions are emerging
110. Moreover, NGO’s and 
subaltern  political  actors  are  in  the  grey  area  at  somewhere  between  public  and  private 
spheres
111, but networked in transnational space with states, in ternational organisations and 
transnational companies indiscriminately, disregarding policies of their own governments. At 
the first glance, it seems that democracy extended with expanding NGO’s and unfettered from 
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formal  bounds  of  constitutionalism,  but  it  is  not  true  for  two  respects.  Firstly,  political 
participation through NGO’s is unreliable and vulnerable, thereby aimed only bargaining as 
powerless  partners  before  insuperable  counterparts  that  they  are  normally  summoned  by 
chance or arbitrariness of powerful agencies. Secondly, NGO’s and communitarian subaltern 
groups  are  representing  a  political  hiatus  which  are  only  capable  to  a  certain  type  of 
deliberation, that is their political concern cannot embrace nationwide issues, instead they are 
concerned with only communal aims, because of their raison d'être is only depending on 
diversity  within  the  general  rest  of  society  and  in  the  vicious  circle  of  hybridisation. 
Subsequently, contrary to their vociferous campaigns, NGO’s are neither capable to hand 
essential problems of society, nor participate any robust deliberation for the future of society, 
which can only capable for murmuring in the long term and impinge procedural guarantees of 
the rule of law. NGO’s contribute constellation of global networks
112, but not democracy, 
because that the demos has been relying on citizenship and territoriality since Cleisthenes 
reforms, maintained with abnegation community affiliations. In this milieu, present forms of 
participatory democracy declining in everywhere or it means “democracy without demos”, 
whereof cannot achieve to replenish the rule of law. 
 
V. Conclusions 
There  is  a  presumed  interrelation  between  autonomy  of  law  and  its  expansion  all 
miscellaneous aspect of the social life in modern society where freedoms of individual and 
comprehensiveness of legal system are contingent, but supposedly balanced in the long run. 
Corollary of those ideas, the rule of law problem covers all inclusive social relations which 
cannot be limited by relationships between law and fundamental institutions of economy and 
politics. In the same way, the rule of law after globalisation inherently juxtaposes the same 
aspects, but, in this paper, I preferred to suffice with criticism on the core problem which 
limited by fundamental nexus of the rule of law. There are remaining headings which are 
being researched and worthwhile to  devote more labour that they, at  least,  include grave 
human rights violations to war prisoners in Guantanamo or elsewhere after 11
th September, 
abolition  of  international  law  which  perpetrated  by  the  United  States  against  in  Iraq  and 
subsequent so-called “the Arab Spring”, the rule of law is being overridden by way policing 
in national and transnational spheres, the enemy criminal law, enhancing discrimination and 
maltreatment to immigrant workers, foreign nationals and asylum seekers and paralysis in 
international  organisations  in  issues  concerned  other than transnational capital.  All  of the 
                                                           
112 See, Peter J. Taylor, “Relocating the Demos?,” Transnational Democracy, Ed. by, James Anderson, 2002, 
236-244. 37 
prospective headings denote inexorable deficiencies of the contemporary world which seem 
not to be repaired in the short run.  
The rule of law is politico-legal domain that it stipulates legitimacy of political power by 
way of anchoring law whatsoever restricts political and administrative discretion. Despite the 
fact that some differences can be delineated according to national experiences of the rule of 
law, it can only be viable when some number of constraints safeguard it, whatsoever may rely 
on constitution, political equilibrium and other structural basements of legal system, very 
likely to the structural components of society. In this context, the rule of law is status quo in 
itself,  which  is  due  to  equilibrium  between  law  and  politics  under  primacy  of  judiciary. 
Historically, the rule of law began with judge made law, which viable in the liberal society, 
and installed to the democratisation of mass society with relocation legislative means and 
entrenchment  to  the  legal  corpus,  as  having  been  seen  in  the  welfare  state.  After  the 
globalisation,  political  basement  of  the  rule  of  law  was  faded  away,  where  politico-legal 
domain is incrementally transmuting to plutocracy; therefore there is no room for the rule of 
law, neither democracy.      
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